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Using a stakeholder management approach, this thesis helps the U.S. Navy 
understand who the external stakeholders are with respect to the Thirty-Year 
Shipbuilding Plan, the priority of differing stakeholder claims, and the nature of the U.S 
shipbuilding industry, one key stakeholder group.  By citing the over-arching goals of the 
Navy's shipbuilding plan, reviewing Congressional testimony and reports on this plan, 
and financial analysis of individual shipbuilding firms, this thesis discerns key facets that 
explain shipbuilder behavior.  To better manage shipbuilders, the Navy should develop 
strategies that refine shipbuilding business cases by stabilizing production rates, 
achieving greater design stability, and reducing order intervals. 
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Applying R. Edward Freeman’s (1984) stakeholder analysis process to the U.S. 
Navy’s Thirty-Year Shipbuilding Plan, this thesis identifies key stakeholders, defines and 
provides an explanation for their current behavior, and proposes an independent 
stakeholder strategy the Navy can apply that helps manage one key stakeholder group, 
shipbuilders. 
In identifying stakeholders of the Navy’s shipbuilding plan, Freeman’s first step, 
this thesis uses Frooman’s (1999) application of resource dependence theory to 
stakeholder analysis.  Two key stakeholder groups emerge, Congress and the tier one 
shipbuilding firms, Northrop Grumman Ship Systems and General Dynamics Marine 
Systems.  Focusing on only one stakeholder group, shipbuilders, this thesis reviews 
recent Congressional testimony from these firms and the American Shipbuilding 
Association, an industry trade group, to identify their current behavior, the second step in 
Freeman’s process.  One key concern is instability in the shipbuilding industry.  Both the 
Government Accountability Office and Congressional Research Service corroborate this 
concern. 
Freeman’s third step is to explain stakeholder behavior.  Michael Porter (1980) 
provides a method to understand the competitive forces in an industry.  This thesis 
analyzes those forces in the U.S. Shipbuilding industry.  It also examines the financial 
and labor pressures under which these firms operate. 
The relationship between the Navy and shipbuilders is one of mutual dependence.  
As such, this thesis recommends using a collaborative strategy to manage shipbuilders.  
This strategy entails adopting the June 2007 GAO recommendations that call for the 
Navy to use better business cases for shipbuilding programs.  These improved business 
cases will increase stability in the industry.  Additionally, the Navy should maintain year-
to-year stability in the shipbuilding plan with the number of ships it proposes to build.  
With stability in the industry, firms will be able to lower costs and provide the Navy with 
ships at a lower price. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Christopher Cavas (2007) reports in the Navy Times that Northrop Grumman 
received a “scathing rebuke” from Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter for its 
performance building USS SAN ANTONIO (LPD 17), the first in a new class of 
amphibious warships.  In a letter to the chairman of Northrop Grumman, he criticized the 
company for an inability to meet schedule and cost targets and poor construction 
standards (Cavas, 2007).  The Navy accepted LPD-17 with numerous outstanding 
deficiencies.  In the same letter, Secretary Winter wrote, “By taking delivery of ships 
with serious quality problems, the Fleet has suffered unacceptable delays in obtaining 
deployable assets.  Twenty-three months after [the] commissioning of LPD-17, the Navy 
still does not have a mission-capable ship” (Cavas, 2007, ¶5).  Additionally, Secretary 
Winters stated he has grave concerns about other ships the company is scheduled to 
build, including the Zumwalt (DDG 1000) Class destroyer and the LHA-6 class 
amphibious assault ships (Cavas, 2007).  
 One aim Admiral Mike Mullen, Chief of Naval Operations, had with the first 
shipbuilding plan released during his tenure was to stabilize the shipbuilding industrial 
base.  This stabilization would allow both the Navy and industry to plan efficiently 
(Department of the Navy, 2007).  Additionally, he wanted a single number of battle force 
ships to meet the Navy’s operational requirements.  The answer was a 313-ship Navy 
(CBO, 2006).  But as the aforementioned situation between Northrop Grumman and the 
Secretary of the Navy highlights, these goals are in jeopardy.  How can the Navy ensure 
that the goals set forth in their shipbuilding plan are achieved? 
 This thesis will use stakeholder analysis literature to conduct a stakeholder 
analysis of the U.S. Navy’s Thirty-Year Shipbuilding Plan.  Stakeholder analysis has 
proven itself to be a valuable tool to understand an organization’s external environment.  
Understanding this external environment will aid the U.S. Navy in understanding the 
motivations of private shipbuilding firms, Congress, and other stakeholders.  While the 
Navy seeks approval of this plan, external stakeholders seek to influence and change the 
decision that Congress will ultimately make.  Based on this external stakeholder 
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understanding, the U.S. Navy can develop an integrated stakeholder strategy to gain 
approval of its proposed Thirty-Year Shipbuilding Plan and achieve their desired Fleet. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The primary research question this thesis answers is what can the U.S Navy learn 
about its external environment with respect to the Thirty-Year Shipbuilding Plan using 
stakeholder analysis research?  In so doing, this thesis answers four supporting research 
questions: 
1.  Who are the U.S. Navy’s external stakeholders in regards to the Thirty-      
      Year Shipbuilding Plan? 
     2.  What is the salience of those external stakeholders? 
     3.  How are shipbuilders currently behaving?  
     4.  Why are shipbuilders behaving in this manner? 
B. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in this thesis will follow the process in R. Edward 
Freeman’s 1984 stakeholder analysis work Strategic Management: A Stakeholder 
Approach.  This process begins by defining who a firm’s stakeholders are.  In defining a 
firm’s stakeholders, Mitchell, Bradley, and Woods (1997) narrow Freeman’s definition 
and suggest examining a stakeholder’s salience, i.e. the possession of three key attributes: 
power, legitimacy, and urgency.  By determining stakeholder salience, a firm can see 
who its stakeholders are and the ability of each to bring pressure against the firm or aid 
the firm through cooperation. 
Next, Freeman suggests a firm analyze the behavior of its stakeholders to 
determine its cooperative potential and competitive threat.  Thirdly, a firm should view 
the issue through the eyes of the stakeholder, explaining that stakeholder’s behavior by 
understanding the pressures under which that stakeholder operates.  Finally, Freeman 
suggests generic strategies a firm can use in order to develop an integrated stakeholder 
program. 
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This thesis draw on publicly available data including, but not limited to, 
Congressional testimony from the U.S. Navy and American Shipbuilding Association, 
Congressional Research Service reports, Government Accountability Office reports, 
Congressional Budget Office reports, shipbuilding firms 10-K reports filed with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, and reports from various think tanks. 
C. SCOPE 
In order to keep this thesis manageable, it only examines the behavior of one 
stakeholder group in detail, shipbuilders.  Shipbuilders include the “Big Six,” which build 
90 percent of the Navy’s vessels.  Northrop Grumman Ship Systems owns Avondale, 
Ingalls Shipbuilding, and Newport News.  General Dynamics Marine Systems owns Bath 
Iron Works, Electric Boat, and National Steel and Shipbuilding Company (NASSCO).  
Because these yards do very little commercial construction, this thesis does not address 
the global commercial shipbuilding industry.  This thesis also limits itself to using only 
information available to the general public.  This thesis will not develop an integrated 
stakeholder strategy, the final step in Freeman’s process. 
D. RESEARCH BENEFITS 
An external stakeholder analysis of the Navy’s Thirty-Year Shipbuilding Plan 
provides Navy managers an accurate picture of who their stakeholders are and each 
stakeholder’s salience.  This research provides a detailed examination of one key 
stakeholder, shipbuilders, and proposes an individual stakeholder strategy to manage this 
group.  An understanding of this external environment can also help Navy managers 
make more informed program decisions. 
Additionally, this thesis lays the foundation for future researchers to continue 
Freeman’s stakeholder analysis process through detailed examination of other external 
stakeholders and development of a larger integrated stakeholder strategy, thus completing 
Freeman’s process.  Effective management and execution of this strategy will aid the 
Navy in its ultimate goal of attaining a fleet of 313-ships. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. THE U.S. NAVY’S THRITY-YEAR SHIPBUILDING PLAN 
Orders for warships declined 60 percent during the ten years since the end of the 
Cold War (Bureau of Export Administration, 2001).  Since the start of the 21st Century, 
the Navy has had a total of four shipbuilding plans each stating a different total of battle 
force ships.  In 2001, the Quadrennial Defense Review called for a 310-ship Navy.  From 
2002-2004, the Navy proposed a 375-ship fleet.  In March 2005, the Navy submitted a 
shipbuilding plan calling for a fleet of between 260-325 battle force ships (Congressional 
Research Service, 2006). 
The fourth iteration came in the summer of 2005 when the new Chief of Naval 
Operations, Admiral Michael Mullen, ordered a reexamination of this plan in order to 
accomplish two goals: 1) arrive at a single numerical fleet requirement and 2) provide 
stability in year-to-year construction of naval ships so that both the shipbuilding industry 
and Navy could plan more efficiently (Congressional Budget Office, 2006).  The Navy 
submitted its new plan in February 2006, settling on a permanent number of 313 battle 
force ships, keeping in mind that the actual number of ships would rise and fall 
depending on commissioning and decommissioning schedules and based on what 
budgetary resources Congress appropriated for purchasing new ships (Congressional 
Budget Office, 2006).  In keeping with Admiral Mullen’s goals, both the 2007 and 2008 
plans call for a 313-ship fleet, while the mix of ship types fluctuated from year to year. 
In terms of the composition of the 313-ship fleet, the FY 2008 plan calls for 11 
aircraft carriers, 69 guided missile destroyers, 19 guided missile cruisers, 55 littoral 
combat ships, 48 attach submarines, 4 guided missile submarines, 31 amphibious ships, 
12 future maritime pre-positioning ships, and 50 logistics and support ships 
(Congressional Budget Office, 2007). 
 8
B. THE U.S. DEFENSE BUDGETARY ENVIRONMENT AND THE 
SHIPBUILDING PLAN 
In 2006, the GAO released a report describing challenges to the Navy’s 
shipbuilding plan.  One challenge cited is the increasing demands on discretionary 
dollars, from which the Navy receives shipbuilding funds (Francis, 2006).  Other 
demands include increasing national health care costs caused by known demographic 
trends.  Additionally, current military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan add pressure to 
Department of Defense (DoD) weapons investments by accelerating the need to refurbish 
or replace existing equipment (Francis, 2006). 
The Congressional Research Service doubts whether the Navy’s FY 2008 
shipbuilding plan is executable.  They point to five assumptions the Navy made in order 
for their plan to be affordable and executable: 1) the Navy’s overall budget needs to 
remain essentially flat in real terms (not decline in inflation-adjusted terms), 2) Navy 
Operations and Maintenance (O&M) spending needs to remain flat in real terms (not 
grow), 3) Navy Military Personnel spending needs to remain flat in real terms, 4) Navy 
Research and Development spending needs to decrease from current levels and remain at 
this decreased level over the long-run, and 5) ships must be built at the Navy’s currently 
estimated prices (Congressional Research Service, 2007).  However, there are many 
factors that might cause these assumptions to falter, which will make it “difficult or 
impossible” to execute the Navy’s plan (Congressional Research Service, 2007, p. 13).  
There is a need in the coming years to fund an increased Army and Marine Corps end 
strength while the overall DoD budget remains flat in real terms.  Many observers believe 
money normally going to the Navy and Air Force will have to be transferred to pay for 
this increase in personnel.  Historically, DoD has also had difficulty meeting O&M goals 
(Congressional Research Service, 2007).  Addressing the third assumption, the Navy does 
not have total control over Military Personnel costs because Congress can authorize pay 
and benefit increases.  Regarding the fourth assumption, it will be difficult for the Navy 
to keep R&D costs down over the long-run as it will want to start development on new 
systems.  Finally, addressing the fifth assumption, Navy shipbuilding programs 
 9
experienced significant cost growth in the recent past and the CBO believes this cost 
growth will continue (Congressional Research Service, 2007). 
C. THE U.S. SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY 
Often referred to as the “Big Six,” the six largest shipbuilders perform nearly 90 
percent of all military work.  Classified as tier-1 shipyards, they are structured around 
two major corporations with Bath Iron Works, Electric Boat, and National Steel and 
Shipbuilding Company (NASSCO) part of General Dynamics Marine Systems and 
Avondale, Ingalls Shipbuilding, and Newport News part of Northrop Grumman Ship 
Systems (Bureau of Export Administration, 2006).  Newport News and Electric Boat are 
the only two shipyards that construct nuclear-powered vessels.  Both Bath Iron Works 
and Ingalls build destroyer-type vessels with Ingalls also building amphibious ships along 
with Avondale.  Finally, NASCO, the only yard on the West Coast and the smallest of the 
Big Six, specializes in support and smaller auxiliary ships (Shipbuilding Industry Survey, 
2004). 
The Northrop Grumman Ship Systems includes capabilities to build aircraft 
carriers, amphibious assault ships, surface combatants, nuclear-powered submarines, 
Coast Guard and coastal defense craft, and commercial ships.  They also have a services 
division providing after market sales support for a wide range of naval and commercial 
vessels (Northrop Grumman Corp., 2007).  They operate repair facilities in Norfolk, 
Virginia and San Diego, California.  Some of their U.S. Navy ships building projects 
include the Virginia Class attack submarine, Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) Class AEGIS 
destroyers, San Antonio (LPD 17) Class amphibious assault ships, and a contract to 
design the Zummwalt (DDG 1000) Class.  Northrop Grumman Ship Systmes is the sole 
provider of Nimitz Class aircraft super-carriers and large-deck, 40,500 ton Wasp (LHD-
1) Class amphibious assault ships (Northrop Grumman Corp., 2007). 
General Dynamics Marine Systems designs, builds and supports submarines, 
surface combatants, and auxiliary ships for the U.S. Navy.  They are the lead contractor 
for the DDG 51 Arleigh Burke Class destroyer and the Virginia Class attack submarine.  
Additionally, they have the second of two contracts to design the Zumwalt (DDG 1000) 
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Class destroyer, and is one of two industry teams contracted to build the Littoral Combat 
Ship.  Finally, they build the T-AKE Lewis and Clark Class dry-cargo/ammunition 
combat-logistics ship (General Dynamics Annual Report, 2007). 
The American Shipbuilding Association (ASA), an industry trade group, often 
represents the interests of these firms.  ASA member shipyards employ ninety percent of 
the nation’s workers engaged in shipbuilding.  Additionally, the ASA represents eighty-
eight partner companies that design and manufacture ship systems and components.  All 
Bix Six yards are members of the ASA (American Shipbuilding Association, 2007). 
 11
III. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
Stakeholder theory confronts the traditional economic model of the firm, offering 
an alternative model of firm behavior based upon the relationship of the firm with its 
external environment (Simmons & Lovegroove, 2005).  To take a stakeholder approach 
involves three related premises: firms/organizations have a multitude of external 
constituencies that affect or are affected by them; the process and outcome of these 
interactions impact both stakeholder and the firm; and stakeholder perceptions influence 
the viability of strategic options (Simmons and Lovegroove, 2005). 
Freeman (1984) developed a process firms can use to examine their external 
environment and ultimately, develop strategies to manage their relationship with their 
external stakeholders.  Jeff Frooman, who uses Freeman’s work as the basis for his 
research into stakeholder influence strategies, believes Freeman’s stakeholder analysis 
process breaks down into three general questions about stakeholders (Frooman, 1999): 
1) Who are the stakeholders? (This concerns their attributes.) 
2) What do they want? (This concerns their ends.) 
3) How are they going to try and get it? (This concerns their means.) 
The next sections address Freeman’s process to answer these questions by first 
defining who the stakeholders are, analyzing and explaining their behavior, and how they 
might obtain their goals. 
A. DEFINE WHO THE STAKEHOLDERS ARE 
Mitchell, Agle, and Wood (1997) develop a list of stakeholder attributes, power, 
legitimacy, and urgency, to determine who stakeholders are.  They examine the varying 
definitions “stakeholder” in stakeholder literature and catalog them into two categories: 
broad and narrow.  Broad definitions enable many external entities to be viewed as a 
stakeholder while narrow definitions reduce that number.  They note that broad 
definitions tend to focus on a stakeholder’s power to influence the organization’s 
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behavior while those who favored a narrow definition focus on the legitimacy of the 
stakeholder’s claim (Mitchell et al., 1997).  Legitimacy is defined as “a generalized 
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate 
within some socially constructed system of norms, values, and beliefs” (Mitchell, et al., 
1997, p. 869).  Mitchell et al. (1997) state that while not the primary feature of any 
organizational theory, the attribute of urgency is implicit.  Urgency is defined as the 
“degree to which stakeholder claims call for immediate attention” (p. 867) and exists 
when only two conditions are met: (1) a claim is time-sensitive and (2) when that claim is 
critical to the stakeholder. 
Frooman (1999) uses resource dependence theory to help define stakeholder 
power.  To frame resource dependence theory, he cites Pfeffer and Salancik’s argument 
that: 
Because organizations are not self-contained or self-sufficient, the 
environment must be relied upon to provide support.  For continuing to 
provide what the organization needs, the external groups or organizations 
may demand certain actions from the organization in return.  It is the fact 
of the organization’s dependence on the environment that makes the 
external constraint and control of organizational behavior both possible 
and almost inevitable (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978: 31). 
 
Resource dependence is said to exist when any one of the following five 
conditions exist: when one actor is supplying another with a resource that is marked by 1) 
concentration (few suppliers), 2) controllability, 3) immobility, 4) unsustainability, or 5) 
essentiality (Frooman, 1999).  The criticality of a resource depends on whether an 
organization can exist without it. 
Based on what attributes a stakeholder possesses, Mitchell, et al. (1997) place 
them into particular categories and subcategories.  These specific categories and 
subcategories characterize the type of salience the stakeholder maintains.  Mitchell et al. 
(1997) define salience as “the degree to which managers give priority to competing 
stakeholder claims” (p. 869).  Table 2 displays these categories and subcategories and 
























Table 1.   Stakeholder Classifications [After: Mitchell, et al. (1997)] 
Stakeholder attributes are variable, socially constructed, and willful exercise of an 
attribute may or may not exist.  These features provide a framework as to how 
stakeholders gain or lose salience in an organization.  Latent stakeholders possess only 
one of the three attributes and salience is be low.  Expectant stakeholders possess two of 
the three attributes and have moderate salience.  Definitive stakeholders possess all three 
of the attributes and will have high salience (Mitchell et al., 1997). 
Dormant stakeholders lack a legitimate relationship and urgent claim, so their 
power goes unused.  Because it is nearly impossible to predict when they may acquire a 
second attribute, managers should remain cognizant of them because their salience will 
increase should acquire another attribute (Mitchell et al., 1997).  Discretionary 
stakeholders are likened to corporate philanthropy and absent power and urgent claims, 
can be disregarded by managers.  Demanding stakeholders are annoying, yet not 
dangerous and warrant nothing more than passing attention by management (Mitchell et 
al., 1997). 
Dominant stakeholders have legitimate claims upon the organization and the 
power with which to act on these claims.  It is expected that these stakeholders will have 
some formal mechanism in the firm that acknowledges this position (Mitchell, et al., 
1997).  Stakeholders having urgency and legitimacy are called dependent because they 
depend on another organization for power to exercise their claim.  Managers must be 
particularly weary of dangerous stakeholders, those having power and urgency (Mitchell 
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et al., 1997).  These stakeholders will be coercive and on rare occasions, potentially 
violent.  Mitchell et al. use the term coercive because “the use of coercive power often 
accompanies illegitimate status” (p. 877), legitimacy being the missing attribute. 
Finally, definitive stakeholders possess all three attributes.  When an urgent claim 
arises with stakeholders in this subcategory, managers should give priority to this 
stakeholder’s claim (Mitchell et al., 1997). 
B. STAKEHOLDER BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS 
After a firm identifies its stakeholders and their respective stake on the firm, the 
next step is to consider these stakeholders’ behavior (Freeman, 1984).  There are three 
categories of behavior for any stakeholder.  To analyze the first, the manager lists those 
behaviors that have actually been observed by a specific stakeholder.  This describes the 
present state of the relationship between the firm and the stakeholder (Freeman, 1984).  
With respect to cooperative potential, the manager lists tangible, future stakeholder 
behaviors that would aid the firm in accomplishing its objectives.  In other words, what 
changes in actual behavior can the stakeholder make to be more helpful to the firm 
(Freeman, 1984)?  Finally, analyzing competitive threat requires the manager to list 
future stakeholder behaviors that would prevent or hinder the firm from achieving its 
objective.  This enables a manager to visualize the adverse risk associated with this 
stakeholder (Freeman, 1984). 
C. STAKEHOLDER BEHAVIOR EXPLANATION 
The third step is to construct a logical explanation for the stakeholder’s behavior 
(Freeman, 1984).  Ask the question “why is the stakeholder behaving the way they are?”  
The manager places himself/herself in the position of the stakeholder and attempts to 
empathize with that stakeholder’s position.  View the issue through the eyes of the 
stakeholder and try to understand the external environment of that particular stakeholder.  
Doing so allows the manager to see the external pressures and forces acting on that 
stakeholder (Freeman, 1984). 
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One method of understanding the external environment of a stakeholder is by 
examining the competitive forces and pressures that firm is under in their industry.  
Michael Porter (1980) proposes five primary forces that aid in understanding these 
pressures: buyer power, supplier power, rivalry amongst existing firms, threat of 
substitute products, and the threat of new entry.  Figure 1 displays these five competitive 
forces.  The collective strength of these forces determines profit potential, where profit is 

















Figure 1. Forces Driving Industry Competition [From: Porter, 1980]. 
Buyers can force down prices in an industry, demanding higher quality or more 
services, and playing competitors against each other.  Buyers are powerful if the 
following criteria hold true: they are concentrated or purchase large volumes relative to 
seller sales, the products buyers purchase represent a significant fraction of their 
purchases or those products are undifferentiated, and the buyer has full information 
(Porter, 1980). 
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Suppliers exert power over industry firms by control over the prices or quality of 
supplies industry firms require.  Suppliers can raise the price of materials or decrease the 
quality of these materials.  Suppliers are powerful under the following conditions (Porter, 
1980): they are more concentrated than the industry they sell to (fewer suppliers than 
buyers), they do not have to worry about other firms providing substitute goods to 
industry firms, and their products are an important input to the buyer’s business. 
Intensity of rivalry among existing competitors occurs because one or more of 
these competitors sees an opportunity or feels the pressure to gain position (Porter, 1980).  
Substitute products are those that can perform the same function as the product of the 
industry and limit the potential returns on an industry by placing a ceiling on the prices 
firms can charge (Porter, 1980).  Finally, new entrants into an industry, including those 
who enter through acquisition of a company already in the industry, introduces new 
production capacity, a desire to gain market share, and usually substantial resources with 
which to accomplish these goals (Porter, 1980).  Two factors determine whether a firm 
enters into an industry: barriers to entry and the subsequent reaction from existing firms 
should the new firm enter the industry.  Barriers to entry include the need for economies 
of scale, capital requirements, any customer switching costs to use the new firm’s 
product, and other cost disadvantages independent of scale (Porter, 1980). 
Industry competition continuously works to drive down profits to a floor rate.  
Porter (1980) states investors will not tolerate returns below this rate because they could 
have invested their money somewhere else, as he suggests, very stable long-term 
government securities.  These securities are considered the opportunity cost of capital, the 
other investment opportunities forfeited by the investor (Mankiw, 2004). 
By completing these steps, the manager attains answers to basic questions about 
the stakeholder (Freeman, 1984): 
Over the long run, what is the stakeholder trying to accomplish? 
On the issue in question, what is the stakeholder trying to accomplish? 
What is the link between their long-run objective and current issue? 
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By answering these questions, the manager ultimately answers the question this 
step originally asked, “why is the stakeholder behaving the way they are?” 
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IV. WHO ARE THE STAKEHOLDERS 
The first step in conducting a stakeholder analysis is defining who the 
stakeholders of a firm are (Freeman, 1984).  In this case, this means asking who are the 
stakeholders of the Navy’s Thirty-Year Shipbuilding Plan?  This thesis uses Frooman’s 
(1999) stakeholder work expounding resource dependence theory and Mitchell, Angle, 
and Wood’s (1997) salience approach to answer this question.  Money is the resource the 
Navy has that shipbuilders are seeking.  However, because the Navy obtains this money 
for shipbuilding through the federal budgeting process instead of selling a good or service 
as a private firm does, it is important to understand this budgeting process. 
A. THE DEFENSE ACQUISITION PROCESS 
Each year, Congress requires the Navy to submit a long-range shipbuilding plan.  
It is from this plan that the Navy develops the funding levels it desires for the 
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) account.  This budget is rolled up into the 
larger Department of Defense (DoD) budget and submitted annually as the President’s 
budget proposal to the Congress.  At this point, Congress assumes control and begins 
proceedings to determine what programs will be authorized and how much money will be 
appropriated for those authorizations.  There are three phases to this process: the budget 
resolution, passage of the defense authorization act, and finally, passage of the defense 
appropriations act (McCaffery and Jones, 2004). 
The budget plan proposed by the Congress is called the Budget Resolution.  This 
resolution represents a commitment by the Congress to itself outlining how much it will 
tax and spend in the upcoming appropriation process; it is only a guide (McCaffery and 
Jones, 2004).  The next phase is the passage of the defense authorization act, which 
becomes law after the president signs it.  The Congressional authorizing committees for 
DoD are both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees.  This act approves 
defense programs, with a particular focus on newly proposed programs.  This act can also 
provides spending and policy guidelines for the DoD.  It is important to note that the 
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DoD cannot spend money on existing or new programs, even if Congress provides money 
for them in appropriations, until they are authorized (McCaffery and Jones, 2004).   
The third phase results in the defense appropriations act, primarily prepared by 
the House and Senate Appropriations Committees and the respective subcommittees for 
national defense (McCaffery and Jones, 2004).  This act provides sums of money to DoD 
accounts with precise language found in the committee reports accompanying this act.  
These reports show the amount of money appropriated to each account line-by-line and if 
no specific language changes the DoD request, the Congress considers the justifications 
the DoD presented as binding, expecting DoD to execute those programs in accordance 
with their justification documents (McCaffery and Jones, 2004).  Committee reports do 
not have the force of law, as does the defense appropriations act, but when the DoD fails 
to follow the guidance the reports set forth, someone from DoD will have to testify as to 
why.  Failing to heed these reports could mean tighter restrictions on the DoD, requests 
for documents, and additional reporting requirements (McCaffery and Jones, 2004).  
Congress arrives at these programmatic and appropriations decisions by holding 
hearings, listening to testimony from the DoD as well as other parties with an interest in 
what defense programs the act authorizes.  Other parties can include independent think 
tanks like the Rand Corporation, lobby groups, trade associations, or even Congressional 
agencies like the Governmental Accountability Office (GAO), the Congressional 
Research Service (CRS), and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO).  Additionally, 
when the versions of the various House and Senate bills do not match, specific members 
in leadership positions meet in a conference committee, which allows the two chambers 
to work out a compromise solution that can be passed by the entire House and Senate.  
These conference committees are usually the focus of intense lobbying efforts 
(McCaffery and Jones, 2004). 
B. DEFINING THE STAKEHOLDERS 
Shipbuilding firms constructing surface combatants rely almost solely on the 
Navy for their income, making them highly dependent on the Navy.  The Navy depends 
on the two primary shipbuilders for construction of naval vessels.  These ships cost a 
 21
great deal of money to build and are purchased from money appropriated by Congress to 
the Navy’s SCN account.  Because legitimacy is defined as “a generalized perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, and beliefs” (Mitchell, et al., 1997, p. 869), 
shipbuilders have a legitimate claim on the Navy’s Thirty-Year Shipbuilding Plan. 
One of the primary goals of a business operating in the free market system is to 
make a profit.  Each quarter, General Dynamics and Northrop Grumman, the parent 
companies of the primary shipbuilding firms, release quarterly earnings reports.  They 
also release annual reports at the end of their company’s fiscal year.  The shipbuilding 
business units of both parent companies play an important role in those company-wide 
statements.  In turn, the public – and potential investors - place great importance on those 
reports.  Those reports effect the public’s perception of the company’s future profitability 
and as such, stock prices of the company rise and fall based on those perceptions.  
Unprofitable quarters and years drive the stock price of the company down.  Likewise, 
profitable quarters and years increase the stock price.  News also impacts stock prices.  
For example, if the Navy announces the awarding of a ship construction contract, the 
public perception of that company’s profitability outlook increases.  Conversely, the 
canceling of a contract would have the opposite effect, negatively impacting the public’s 
perception of profitability.  Therefore, shipbuilding firms posses a second attribute, 
urgency.  Recall that Mitchell, et al. (1997) define urgency as “the degree to which 
stakeholder claims call for immediate attention,” and is synonymous with words like 
“compelling, driving, and imperative” (p. 867).  Urgency is said to exist when two 
conditions are met: 1) when the claim or relationship is important to the stakeholder and 
2) that claim is of a time-sensitive nature where time sensitivity is defined as “the degree 
to which managerial delay in attending to the claim or relationship is unacceptable to the 
stakeholder” (p. 867).  Both conditions are met in that as the sole customer for both 
shipbuilding firms, Navy shipbuilding decisions are not just important, but critical to 
those firms because those decisions directly impact the firms’ profitability.  
Using the system set forth by Mitchell, Angle, and Wood (1997), shipbuilders are 
categorized as expectant stakeholders because they posses legitimacy and urgency and 
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are of the dependent stakeholder class because they lack power to carry out their desires 
and therefore, depend on others to help them achieve their goals (Mitchell, et al., 1997).  
The Navy can anticipate them to take an active versus passive stance.  Shipbuilders have 
experienced some success in furthering their desires through working with others.  
Successful lobby efforts by the American Shipbuilding Association (ASA), a trade 
organization comprised predominantly by the two shipbuilding firms, resulted in the 
Congress passing multiple pieces of legislation proposed by the ASA. 
The Congress is another important stakeholder.  They pass the defense 
authorization act, deciding what programs the DoD undertakes, and the appropriations 
act, using their constitutional power of the purse to provide funding for those various 
programs (McCaffery and Jones, 2004).  Because they control the resource on which the 
shipbuilding firms and Navy are dependent, Congress possesses the attribute of power.  
On a larger scale, Congress also has a significant interest in the national security of the 
United States of which the health of the Fleet is an important piece.  Additionally, 
specific congressmen and women and senators represent constituencies that have a 
significant interest in the Navy’s shipbuilding plan.  Shipbuilding firms are large 
employers in the states and districts where they are located.  Their success or failure can 
mean jobs lost or gained and ultimately, votes for or against incumbent representatives 
and senators.  As such, Congress possesses a legitimate claim on the Navy’s Thirty-Year 
Shipbuilding Plan. 
Because they possess power and legitimacy, Congress is categorized as an 
expectant stakeholder and placed in the dominant stakeholder class (Mitchell, et al., 
1997).  Their influence on the Navy’s shipbuilding plan is assured. 
There are other stakeholders to the Navy’s shipbuilding plan, but these firms’ role 
are relatively minor because they are smaller, usually technology-based firms that 
typically provide components that are installed on warships, combat systems and 
engineering plant components, for example.  These firms have a legitimate claim on the 
shipbuilding plan, but lack both power and urgency.  Therefore, they are in the latent 
stakeholder class and are considered discretionary stakeholders (Mitchell, et al., 1997).  
Without an urgent claim and the power to impose their will, there is no pressure for the 
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Navy to be overly concerned with this stakeholder group.  Of note, many of these firms 
are members of the ASA and can have their desires expressed through that trade 
organization if they so desire (American Shipbuilders Association Partners, n.d.).  For the 
purposes of this thesis, latent stakeholders are not considered for deeper investigation. 
Utilizing resource dependence theory, this chapter determines the key 
stakeholders to the Navy’s Thirty-Year Shipbuilding Plan.  The resource in question is 
federal appropriations to the Shipbuilding Conversion Navy account.  The Navy submits 
its shipbuilding plan each year to Congress.  Additionally, they request funding for 
shipbuilding through the Department of Defense based on this plan.  Based on the Navy’s 
request and input from others, Congress authorizes and appropriates money to the Navy 
for the building of ships.  The Navy, in turn, authorizes construction contracts and 
purchases these ships from shipbuilders based on the shipbuilding plan.  The primary 
recipients of shipbuilding money are General Dynamics Marine Systems and Northrop 
Grumman Ships Systems.  Using Mitchel, Agle, and Wood’s (1997) stakeholder salience 
research, this chapter classifies shipbuilders as expectant stakeholders because they 
posses legitimacy and urgency.  The Navy can anticipate expectant stakeholders to take 
an active versus passive position towards the shipbuilding plan.  Specifically, 
shipbuilders are of the dependent stakeholder class because they lack power to carry out 
their desires and therefore, depend on others to help them achieve their goals with regard 
to the Navy’s shipbuilding plan.  Congress is categorized as an expectant stakeholder and 
are of the dominant stakeholder class because they possess power and legitimacy.  Their 
influence on the Navy’s shipbuilding plan is assured. 
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V. STAKEHOLDER BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS 
The second step in conducting a stakeholder analysis is to analyze stakeholder 
behavior, accomplished in three parts.  The first is to examine their actual or observed 
behavior.  During their budgetary decision making process for Fiscal Year 2008, a 
Congressional subcommittee called shipbuilding firms, the American Shipbuilders 
Association, and Navy leadership responsible for the Thirty-Year Shipbuilding Plan to 
testify.  This testimony provides a wealth of insight as to shipbuilder’s problems and 
recommendations.  The second part of analyzing a stakeholder’s behavior is to define 
their cooperative potential (Freeman, 1984), that is, to ask what the stakeholders could do 
to aid the Navy in accomplishing the goals set forth in the shipbuilding plan.  The final 
part is to define the shipbuilding firms’ competitive threat by listing behaviors that would 
prevent the Navy from accomplishing the goals of the shipbuilding plan (Freeman, 1984). 
A. OBSERVED BEHAVIOR 
The president of the ASA, Ms. Cynthia Brown in her March 20, 2007 testimony 
to the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary 
Forces, points to three main issues impacting the shipbuilding industry, which Congress 
can correct.  The ASA desires to increase and stabilize ship production, stop the practice 
of contract retentions and withholdings, and to have U.S. acquisition laws enforced.  Also 
testifying during the same hearing, Mr. Philip A. Teel, President of Northrop Grumman 
Ship Systems, compares best-in-class shipbuilding techniques and business models with 
those of the U.S. industry, pointing out their vast differences.  By adopting many best-in-
class practices and changing U.S. Navy shipbuilding program models, he believes the 
U.S. shipbuilding industry will increase efficiency and provide the Navy with the ships it 
needs at lower cost.  Finally, corroborating this testimony are two Congressional 
investigatory agencies, the GAO and CRS.  Paul L. Francis, Director of the GAO’s 




business cases for the construction of naval vessels.  The CRS finds that current and 
predicted future production levels for the various shipyards are below the levels of just a 
decade and a half ago. 
1. Ms. Cynthia Brown, President, American Shipbuilding Association 
Low and unstable rates of naval ship production negatively impact the 
shipbuilding industrial base.  Because of changing production schedules and profiles, 
shipyards have great difficulty managing workloads necessary to retain highly trained 
production and engineering workers (Brown, 2007).  Shipyards cannot make the 
necessary capital investments in their shipyards to improve production processes and 
facilities nor can they manage day-to-day operations to maximize efficiency in design 
and construction of warships (Brown, 2007).  Capital investments are a key to increasing 
efficiency and decreasing costs.  These capital investments depend on cash flow, work 
projections, and profits.  Given competing corporate needs and interests, low and 
unstable rates of production preclude shipbuilders from presenting such a business case to 
corporate parents and therefore, do not receive money for capital investment.  Facilities 
that demonstrate large profits and return on invested capital receive corporate dollars 
(Statement of Ms. Cynthia L. Brown, 2007).   
Many investments could be made that would show a favorable return on 
investment to the Federal Government.  One such investment is by expanding the use of 
special incentive fees for all Navy shipbuilding contracts; fees specifically designated for 
shipyards to invest in process and facility improvements in business cases where the 
return on investment is favorable to the Navy (Brown, 2007).  The contractor must 
present a business case that: “1) savings through changes in design, material used, 
technology, or production process would result in savings to the ship program, or 2) a 
proposed investment would itself result in savings for a shipbuilding program” (Brown, 
2007, p. 3).  The ASA provides language for inclusion into the FY 2008 Defense 
Authorization Act that authorizes $100 million to begin shipbuilding contract incentive 
fees.  Under the ASA’s proposal, the Navy would be required to report to Congress on 
how they have distributed or plan to distribute that money for specific capital 
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expenditures by shipbuilding program and it instructs the Navy to annually budget money 
for incentive fees for shipbuilding capital investment beginning in FY 2009 (Brown, 
2007).  Ms. Brown (2007) claims this proposal would reduce Navy costs by 
accomplishing four things: 1) emphasizing designs that result in ships easier to produce; 
2) controlling non-value added requirement changes, which are not operational 
necessities and add costs; 3) reducing ship program costs resulting from targeted 
investments, and; 4) improving shipyard competitiveness, which could ultimately 
increase the number of ships ordered in U.S. shipyards.  The hope is that if the Navy, the 
primary buyer of ships from these yards, is able to reduce costs, those cost savings then 
translate into the Navy buying more ships. 
As of her testimony, the Navy had not paid $345 million to shipyards as agreed to 
in their overhaul and shipbuilding contracts.  This adversely affects cash flow, which is 
vital to day-to-day shipyard operations, and in turn, inhibits shipyards from paying 
subcontractors in a timely fashion (Brown, 2007).  Additionally, withholding money 
owed to shipyards negatively impacts their ability to operate more efficiently because 
money they could otherwise spend on process improvement and efficiency gains is tied 
up in paying for other operations.  The ASA provided language for Congress to pass that 
requires the Navy to abide by the terms of contract payment clauses negotiated with each 
shipyard.  Passage of this legislation would ease cash flow constraints, allowing 
shipyards to operate more efficiently in ship production (Brown, 2007).  Shipyards are 
hesitant to take the matter to court because that could halt work on ships and damage the 
working relationship with “their predominant, if not only, customer” (Brown, 2007, p. 5). 
If a dedicated, long-term military ship requirement exists, then in accordance with 
U.S. acquisition laws, it must  be filled by ships built in the U.S.  There are presently 6 
foreign-built ships under lease for terms of 59 months by the Navy that provides military 
sealift capability.  Five of these six ships had their lease renewed for another 59 months, 
totaling nearly 10 years of service in the Navy (Statement of Ms. Cynthia L. Brown, 
2007).  This constitutes a long-term requirement and because the Budget Enforcement 
Act of 1990 defines a vessel lease of five or more years as a purchase, 10 U.S. 7309 
applies.  This law requires that a vessel purchased for all branches of the armed services 
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be built in the United States (Statement of Ms. Cynthia L. Brown, 2007). When the Navy 
circumvents these laws, they hinder the shipbuilding industry from increasing ship 
production.  Because volume cannot be increased, shipbuilders cannot reduce ship prices 
or construction costs and the Navy will pay higher prices for other ships (Statement of 
Ms. Cynthia L. Brown, 2007).  Ms. Brown (2007) urges Congress to include the 
Taylor/Davis legislation in the FY 2008 Defense Authorization Act, stopping the Navy 
from circumventing acquisition law. 
2. Mr. Philip A. Teel, President, Northrop Grumman Ship Systems, Inc. 
Best-in-class shipyards are characterized by an intense focus on design for 
production.  Design for production includes elements like the use of proven systems and 
subsystems, standard parts and components, standard designs, limited customization, 
large production runs, and minimal changes from vessel to vessel (Teel, 2007).  U.S. 
naval shipyards, however, are characterized by advanced technology systems, many 
changes from vessel to vessel, small production runs, and complex, continuously 
evolving designs.  This approach to shipbuilding calls for a custom, flexible production 
process, requiring a job-shop business model (Teel, 2007).  Under current Navy business 
cases, a job-shop business model is the only way to meet Navy requirements that vary 
from program to program, by ship type, and sometimes, even hulls within the same 
program (Teel, 2007).  Best in class shipyards average 240 changes in the designs of the 
first ship in a new class, contrasting, for example, the Navy’s LHD program, which 
experienced 5,750 changes from LHD-1 to LHD-2 and a subsequent average of 3,550 
changes for each follow-on ship (Teel, 2007).  Reducing change orders in ship 
construction is another area to learn from best-in-class yards.  Of the total DDG-51 class 
ships built by Northrop Grumman Ship Systems, change order activity added an 
additional 6 million labor hours to construction, costing $160 million (Teel, 2007).  
Understanding the need to provide the latest technology to warships, Teel advocates 
strong systems engineering skills and shipbuilding teams to balance reducing change 
orders while installing the latest technology (Teel, 2007).   
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Combat systems comprise approximately 55 percent of total ship costs.  Because 
these systems introduce additional complexity into the production process, they also 
impact shipbuilder costs (Teel, 2007).  Subsequent GAO testimony supports Teel, 
addressing the negative impact of immature technologies and design instability in Navy 
shipbuilding business cases. 
3. Corroboration from Congressional Agencies 
Paul L. Francis, Director of the GAO’s Acquisition and Sourcing Management 
Team, states that Navy shipbuilding programs are built around “unexecutable business 
cases” because they require immature technologies, have no design stability until late in 
production, and contain cost and schedule estimates that are “unrealistically low” 
(Francis, 2007, p. 8).  A solid business case requires that key technologies be 
demonstrated before ship development begins and that designs be stabilized before 
construction begins (Francis, 2007).  Once construction starts, the consequences of not 
using a realistic business case become apparent.  Francis (2007) provides an example: the 
most cost efficient sequence of ship construction starts from the bottom up.  Once 
sections of the ship are installed, access to lower decks becomes extremely difficult.  If 
equipment from immature technologies that are to be located on these decks is not ready 
for installation when these lower decks are constructed, the shipyard workers have to 
install them later after other decks and equipment have been installed.  Workers need 
more time for installation of the once missing equipment in these now less accessible 
desk, which causes increased labor hours and costs. 
In addition to reducing both change between ships and the use of immature 
technologies, there are two more techniques that American shipyards can implement from 
best-in-class shipyards: fewer gaps between ships, i.e. reducing order intervals, and 
producing more hulls for each ship class, i.e. increasing run lengths (Teel, 2007).  By way 
of example, the order rate for DDG 51 class ships varied from a high of five ships per 
year to a low of two.  Lengthy production breaks cause learning curve efficiencies to be 
wiped out, increasing labor costs (Teel, 2007).  Analysis from the Congressional 
Research Service (CRS) examines the issue of gaps in the Navy’s shipbuilding plan. 
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Answering a Congressional question as to whether the Navy’s shipbuilding plans 
adequately support the shipbuilding industrial base, the CRS finds that procurement from 
FY2009-2016 increases to between 10 and 14 ships per year, decrease to between 4 and 6 
during the FY2017-FY2020 period, and increase once again to 10 or 11 ships per year 
after 2022 (Congressional Research Service, 2006).  The CRS reports that this pattern 
could place the industry on a production “roller coaster” (p.17) that could decrease 
shipbuilding efficiencies and increase costs. 
Posed this question again in 2007, the Congressional Research Service found that 
the Navy anticipates building an average of 1.5 DDG-1000s and CG(X)s per year over 
the next 17 years.  Because these ships are slightly larger in light-ship displacement than 
DDG-51 class ships, current designs for DDG-1000 and CG(X) indicate that constructing 
1.5 ships per year would be the approximate equivalent of 2.7 DDGs per year.  If this 
construction were to be split evenly between the two shipyards that build surface 
combatants, Ingalls and Bath Iron Works, as it was in building the DDG-51 class, then 
each yard would receive the equivalent of 1.3 DDG-51 ships per year (Congressional 
Research Service, 2007).  During the 1990s, shipyards argued a total of 3 DDGs per year 
would be required to maintain financial health.  An equivalent of 2.7 DDGs represents 
about 90 percent of this rate (Congressional Research Service, 2007).  Moreover, if the 
Navy sought a competition between the two yards, the losing yard would suffer 
significant workload reductions, revenues, and employment (Congressional Research 
Service, 2007). 
The testimony from the ASA and shipbuilders, supported by GAO and CRS 
analysis, is very helpful in understanding the present state of the relationship between 
industry and the Navy shipbuilding plan.  The ASA complains of low and unstable 
production in the U.S. shipbuilding industry caused by the Navy, proposes legislation that 
would stop the Navy’s withholding and retaining money from shipbuilding contracts, and 
asks Congress to enforce U.S. acquisition laws, preventing the Navy from long-term 
leasing of foreign-built ships that equate to purchases.  Finally, Teel recommends the 
adoption of specific best-in-class shipbuilding practices, recommending longer 
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production runs with fewer gaps between ships and stabilized designs marked by using 
mature technologies and reduced changes from ship to ship. 
B. COOPERATIVE POTENTIAL 
Freeman (1984) asks managers to next define a stakeholder’s cooperative 
potential.  What behaviors by shipbuilders could be observed in the future that would aid 
the Navy in accomplishing its shipbuilding plan?  One such behavior would be to fully 
support the Navy’s plan during Congressional hearings and stop proposing legislation 
hindering Navy practices.  Another beneficial behavior would be if shipbuilders lobby 
Congress to appropriate the funds requested by the Navy.  Finally, shipbuilders making 
greater capital investments that improve production processes, increase construction 
efficiencies, and reduce costs to the Navy would be beneficial. 
C. COMPETITIVE THREAT 
The final piece in the analysis of a stakeholder’s behavior is to determine what 
behaviors shipbuilders could exhibit in the future that could prevent the Navy from 
accomplishing its shipbuilding plan (Freeman, 1984).  One such preventative behavior 
would be for shipbuilding firms to not make any or at least fewer capital investments in 
their shipyards.  Another might be to increase lobbying efforts to Congress, proposing 
more legislation beneficial to shipbuilders.  Shipbuilders could reverse their present 
desire to avoid a court battle (Brown, 2007) and take the Navy to court, suing them for 
the retention and withholding of money owed to shipbuilders.  However, each of these 
actions carry risks that shipbuilding firms might not be willing to make out of fear of 
damaging their relationship with their primary customer.  Shipbuilders already show 
reluctance to take the Navy to court over contract retentions and withholdings (Brown, 
2007).  Additionally, these more aggressive are not typical for a dependent stakeholder 
(Mitchell, et al., 1997). 
This chapter analyzes the behavior of shipbuilders by examining their actual 
behavior through testimony given before Congressional hearings.  By reviewing 
Congressional testimony from the President of the American Shipbuilders Association, 
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Ms. Cynthia Brown, and the President of Northrop Grumman’s Ship Systems, Mr. Philip 
Teel, their concerns about the shipbuilding plan become apparent.  They want to increase 
their profits and shareholder value, a basic motivation of any business.  Hampering their 
efforts are low and unstable rates of shipbuilding, production gaps, and instability in ship 
design/reduction of change orders.  The Government Accountability Office largely 
reached the same conclusions, corroborating their testimony.  This chapter then analyzes 
shipbuilder’s cooperative potential by listing future behaviors that would aid the Navy in 
accomplishing their shipbuilding goals.  Finally, it analyzes the shipbuilder’s competitive 
threat by listing future behaviors that would hinder the accomplishment of the Navy’s 
goals.  The next chapter of this thesis conducts Freeman’s (1984) third step in stakeholder 
analysis: explaining their behavior. 
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VI. STAKEHOLDER BEHAVIOR EXPLANATION 
Why are the stakeholders behaving the way they are?  To help answer this 
question, managers must place themselves in the position of the stakeholder and view 
matters through their eyes.  This chapter uses Porter’s (1980) framework to analyze the 
five competitive forces experienced by Northrop Grumman and General Dynamics.  This 
chapter extrapolates data from both General Dynamics and Northrop Grumman’s most 
recent annual reports filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission.  This selected 
financial data provides a measure to evaluate how these firms are performing and helps 
understand these firm’s current positions.  Finally, the labor market in the U.S. 
shipbuilding industry is an important pressures to help understand why these companies 
are behaving the way they are.   
A. FIVE FORCES ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY 
1. Intensity of Rivalry 
Intensity of rivalry among existing competitors occurs because one or more of 
these competitors sees an opportunity or feels the pressure to gain position (Porter, 1980).  
Both General Dynamics Marine Systems and Northrop Grumman Ship Systems 
recognize one another as competitors, but as the following statement from General 
Dynamics indicates, they are also collaborators, “The Marine Systems group has only one 
primary competitor, Northrop Grumman Corporation, with which it also partners or 
subcontracts on several programs, including the Virginia Class submarine and the DDG-
1000 Zummwalt Class destroyer” (General Dynamics, 2005).  As is demonstrated by the 
sharing of naval shipbuilding contracts between the two companies and their various 
shipyards, the U.S. Government keeps these yards functioning, believing it is in their 
long-run interest to maintain them.  However, there are cost implications in so doing 
because contracts are not awarded based on the best value to the government 
(Shipbuilding, 2005).  These implications include lost production efficiencies gained 
from longer production runs and increased volume. 
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Additionally, U.S. Law prohibits the Navy from purchasing ships, especially 
warships, from other countries.  The elimination of these foreign yards from the U.S. 
marketplace serves as a further benefit to Northrop Grumman Ship Systems and General 
Dynamics Marine Systems.  Understandably, there are national security issues in using 
foreign yards, but it is important to understand the trade-offs by removing them from 
competition. 
Porter (1980) predicts that as an industry matures, growth rates decline and rivalry 
intensifies, causing profits to decline and, sometimes, a shakeout to occur in the industry.  
This might explain the shipbuilding industries environment prior to the 1990s, but after 
industry consolidation into two primary firms, government practices give each firm 
contracts in order to keep them operating and eliminate foreign competition, benefiting 
U.S. firms by preventing deteriorating profits caused by true and intense competition. 
2. Buyers 
Buyers are powerful if the following criteria hold true: they are concentrated or 
purchase large volumes relative to seller sales totals, the products buyers purchase 
represent a significant fraction of their purchases or those products are undifferentiated, 
and the buyer has full information (Porter, 1980).  Figure 2 shows the buyers of Northrop 
Grumman’s Ships segment and compares the revenues each generates.  Revenue from the 
U.S. Government includes contracts in which Northrop Grumman is either the prime 
contractor or sub-contractor with the final product sold to the U.S. Government.  Clearly, 
the U.S. Government is the primary, if not sole, source of revenue for the Ship Systmes 
segment of Northrop Grumman.  The 2006 Annual Report notes “The company conducts 
most of its business with the U.S. Government, principally the Department of Defense…” 
(Northrop Grumman, 2007, p.1).  While both primary shipbuilding companies do 
























Figure 2. Northrop Grumman Ship Segment’s Revenue by Customer Group [From: 
Northrop Grumman Annual Report, 2007] 
While General Dynamics Marine Systems did not provide specific segment 
revenue data by customer, they do write in their 2006 Annual Report that “General 
Dynamics primary customer is the U.S. Government, particularly the Department of 
Defense” (General Dynamics, 2007, p.10). 
Even though these firms have one primary buyer, which normally gives the buyer 
that ability to force down prices at the expense of the firm’s profitability, this is offset in 
the shipbuilding industry by the U.S. Government’s desire to award shipbuilding 
contracts to both companies, thereby keeping each afloat.  Additionally, these are the two 
primary firms from which the U.S. Navy is able to purchase ships.  In other words, there 
is no other supplier of ships.  These two factors combine to offset any advantage the 
Navy gains from being the primary buyer. 
3. Suppliers 
Suppliers exert power over industry firms by controlling the prices or quality of 
supplies industry firms require.  Suppliers can raise the price of materials or decrease the 
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quality of these materials.  Suppliers are powerful under the following conditions: they 
are more concentrated than the industry they sell to (fewer suppliers than buyers), they do 
not have to worry about other firms providing substitute goods to industry firms, and 
their products are an important input to the buyer’s business (Porter, 1980).  There is a 
limited supplier base for the unique and highly specialized materials required to build 
ships.  U.S. laws requiring the use of only domestically acquired material further narrow 
the supplier base.  These factors make raw materials susceptible to price increases by the 
supplier (Government Accountability Office, 2005).  Additionally, the Navy’s low rate of 
ship production caused numerous suppliers to close or merge, further reducing supplier 
competition in the marketplace (Government Accountability Office, 2005).   
Marked by high concentration, a lack of substitute supplies, and their product’s 
importance to shipyards, shipbuilders are vulnerable to suppliers who enjoy a moderate 
amount of power in this industry.  Powerful suppliers can squeeze profits out of an 
industry and are subsequently a detriment to the shipbuilding firms (Porter, 1980). 
4. Threat of New Entrants 
New entrants into an industry, including those who enter through acquisition of a 
company already in the industry, introduces new production capacity, a desire to gain 
market share, and usually substantial resources with which to accomplish these goals 
(Porter, 1980).  Two factors determine whether a firm enters into an industry: barriers to 
entry and the subsequent reaction from existing firms should the new firm attempt to 
enter the industry.  Barriers to entry include economies of scale, capital requirements, 
customer’s switching costs to use the new firm’s product, and other cost disadvantages 
independent of scale (Porter, 1980).   
Economies of scale means a decline in the unit cost of a product as the volume in 
a given period increases and that the presence of economies of scale always lead to a cost 
advantage for the large-scale over the small-scale firm (Porter, 1980).  Brown, Teel and 
Francis’s (2007) Congressional testimony confirms there are economies of scale in this 
industry.  Shipbuilders are actively seeking to increase their volume of ship orders so that 
they may realize the benefits of greater economies of scale.  Large sums of money are 
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required for capital investment, especially for a potential entrant starting from scratch.  In 
fact, in the past decade, Northrop Grumman and General Dynamics acquired many 
smaller-scale shipyards, consolidating the industry (Northrop Grumman Annual Report, 
2007; General Dynamics Annual Report, 2007).  As mentioned previously, U.S. law also 
prevents foreign yards from entering the U.S. market.  The presence of these barriers to 
entry makes it unlikely a new firm will enter the shipbuilding industry to compete for 
U.S. Navy construction contracts, benefiting established shipbuilders. 
5. Threat of Substitutes 
Substitute products are those that can perform the same function as the product of 
the industry and limit the potential returns on an industry by placing a ceiling on the 
prices firms can charge (Porter, 1980).  To analyze the threat of substitutes, this question 
must be answered: are there any products that can perform the same function as the 
product of the shipbuilding industry? (Porter, 1980).  The function of warships is to 
protect the United States physically as well as protect U.S. interests abroad through 
command of the seas.  While there are many machines, systems, and other devices that 
provide for the national security interests of the United States, none can do so by 
providing command of the sea.  As such, there are no substitute products for warships, 
bolstering shipbuilding companies. 
B. FINANCIAL POSITIONS 
1. Northrop Grumman 
The Northrop Grumman Ships segment includes capabilities to build aircraft 
carriers, amphibious assault ships, surface combatants, nuclear-powered submarines, 
Coast Guard and coastal defense craft, and commercial ships.  The Ship Systems segment 
also has a services division providing after market sales support for a wide range of naval 
and commercial vessels (Northrop Grumman Corp., 2007).  They operate repair facilities 
in Norfolk, Virginia and San Diego, California.  Some of their U.S. Navy ship building 
projects include the Virginia Class attack submarine, Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) Class 
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AEGIS destroyers, the Zumwalt (DDG 1000) Class destroyer, and  San Antonio (LPD 
17) Class amphibious assault ships.  They are the sole provider of Nimitz Class aircraft 
super-carriers and large-deck, 40,500 ton Wasp (LHD-1) Class amphibious assault ships 
(Northrop Grumman Corp., 2007). 
Figure 3, Northrop Grumman Net Sales by Primary Business, demonstrates that 
Ship Systems is consistently the smallest generator of sales amongst the four primary 
businesses, generating over $5 billion less than the information services business, the 





















Figure 3. Northrop Grumman’s Net Sales by Primary Business [From: Northrop 
Grumman Annual Report, 2007] 
Figure 4, Northrop Grumman Profit Margins by Primary Business, shows that the 
Ships segment generates fewer profits than the three other primary businesses, generating 
only $393 million in profit last year against the $744 million generated by the electronics 





















Figure 4. Northrop Grumman Profit Margins by Primary Business [From Northrop 
Grumman Annual Report, 2007] 
2. General Dynamics 
General Dynamics Marine Systems designs, builds and supports submarines, 
surface combatants, and auxiliary ships for the U.S. Navy.  They are the lead contractor 
for the DDG 51 Arleigh Burke Class destroyer and the Virginia Class attack submarine.  
Additionally, they have the second of two contracts to design the Zumwalt (DDG 1000) 
Class destroyer, and are one of two industry teams contracted to build the Littoral 
Combat Ship.  Finally, they build the T-AKE Lewis and Clark Class dry-
cargo/ammunition combat-logistics ship (General Dynamics Annual Report, 2007). 
They acknowledge that while DoD’s budget has grown rapidly in the past few 
years, there is no guarantee that it will continue and as such, any decrease in U.S. defense 




reduced or canceled.  If either of these were to occur, the company’s ability to sustain 
itself and grow future sales and earnings would be adversely affected (General Dynamics, 
2007). 
Figure 5 illustrates the net sales of each business segment.  Marine Systems 
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Figure 5. General Dynamics Net Sales by Business Segment [From: General 
Dynamics Annual Report, 2007] 
Figure 6 shows General Dynamic’s profit margins by business segment.  In terms 
of 2006 profit, Marine Systems ranks last, $269 million behind third-ranked Aerospace 
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Figure 6. General Dynamics Profit Margins by Business Segment [From: General 
Dynamics Annual Report, 2007] 
3. Return on Investment and Opportunity Costs 
Financial ratio analysis is an important step investors use to determine the 
profitability of a company and ultimately, whether or not to invest money in that 
company.  Return on investment (ROI) applies ratios measuring the income earned from 
invested capital and the ability of the firm to reward investors providing long-term funds 
and attract future investors (Gibson, 2007).  This ratio is widely seen as the ultimate 
measure of corporate performance (Reuters, 2007).  Operating margin is a measure of 
profitability determining how much of each sales dollar remains after subtracting direct 
costs of generating sales and direct costs such as overhead from total revenue and then 
dividing that figure by total revenue (Gibson, 2007; Reuters, 2007).  Table 3 displays the 
return on investment and operating margin of both Northrop Grumman and General 
Dynamics.  Due to the limitations of publicly available material, the ROI figures 
provided below are for the entire company, not just the shipbuilding units.  While this 
impedes determining the specific performance of each company’s shipbuilding units, 
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investors invest in the entire company, not just a specific business segment.  Both 
companies are classified in the aerospace and defense industry and the capital goods 
sector.  The S&P 500 is used to represent the market as a whole.  Of note, ROI and 
operating margin are calculated using a five-year average. Table 3 shows that General 
Dynamics outperforms Northrop Grumman in both ROI and operating margin.  General 
Dynamics also outperforms the industry and sector averages. 
Company Industry Sector S&P 500
Northrop-GrummanROI 4.00 7.66 8.07 11.04
Op. Margin 6.93 7.08 7.97 19.01
General Dynamics ROI 12.02 7.66 8.07 11.04
Op. Margin 10.83 7.08 7.97 19.01  
Table 2.   Return on Investment and Operating Margin as Percentages [From: Reuters, 
2007] 
The opportunity cost of an item is what is given up to get that item (Mankiw, 
2004).  For an investor to invest in either of these two companies, he or she gives up an 
opportunity to place that money in some other investment.  In studying this decision 
making process, economists include opportunity cost because these costs effect the 
decision of the investor (Mankiw, 2004).  It is logical to assume investors will place their 
money in an investment that yields them the highest return for a given risk factor, thus 
lowering their opportunity cost.  Porter (1980) suggests using government securities as a 
floor rate with which to measure the opportunity cost of capital.  As such, table 4 
compares the return on investment of Northrop Grumman and General Dynamics to the 
Ten Year U.S. Treasury Note, a stable, long-term government security. 
10y T-Note Northrop Grumman General Dynamics
ROI 4.39 4.00 12.02  
Table 3.   Return on Investment vs. 10y T-Note [From: Reuters, 2007] 
Because Northrop Grumman lags behind its competitor, industry and sector 
averages, the S&P 500, and the 10-Year Treasury Note, their stake in the shipbuilding 
plan could reasonably be considered to be more urgent and thus, an increased salience. 
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C. LABOR 
Employees and labor challenges are a significant issue with which shipbuilders 
must contend.  “The U.S. Shipbuilding industry lost approximately 150,000 skilled 
employees since the late 1980s, mostly due to the stagnant market” (Shipbuilding 
Industry Study, 2004, p. 13).  The greatest shortages are for welders, ship fitters, and pipe 
fitters.  During economic downturns in the industry, companies are forced to lay-off 
employees and because of the lack of job security, many workers seek employment in 
more stabile industries (Shipbuilding Industry Study, 2004).  General Dynamics (2007) 
states, “Because of the highly specialized nature of its business, the company must be 
able to hire and retain the skilled and appropriately qualified personnel necessary to 
perform the services required by its customers.  If the company is unable to develop new 
products that meet customers’ changing needs or successfully attract and retain qualified 
personnel, future sales and earning my be adversely affected” (p. 15). 
Labor is also a key determinant in productivity and efficiency and represents a 
substantial portion of the total procurement cost of naval ships (RAND, 2006).  These 
labor shortages have led to cost over-runs, outsourcing, and delays in project completion 
(Shipbuilding Industry Study, 2004).  The GAO (2005) reports that data from case study 
ships – DDG 91 and 92, CVN 76 and 77, LPD 17 and 18, and SSN 774 and 775, shows a 
cost growth of $457 million due to increased labor hours.  Labor represents 51 percent of 
the end cost for an aircraft carrier, 47 percent for an amphibious ship, 39 percent for an 
attack submarine, and 32 percent for surface combatant (RAND, 2006). 
In addition to recruiting and retaining skilled workers, another challenge the 
industry faces is an aging workforce.  Industry estimates show the average worker is in 
their late 40s to early 50s.  The impending retirements of these workers will further 
hamper the industry’s labor market.  These retirements will also place an increased 
financial burden on industry as more and more workers begin drawing their pensions 
(Shipbuilding Industry Study, 2004).  Some of the $457 million in overhead increases is 
due to increased benefits like pensions and medical care costs (GAO, 2005).  RAND 
(2006) reports that from 1977 to 2005, the burdened labor rate, the rate the Navy pays for 
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labor, increased at an annual rate of 5.5 percent.  This is 1.3 percent higher than the 
annual consumer price index during the same time period.  Shipyards attribute this 
increase to higher health care costs, increased disability costs, and a declining business 
base.  Of note, direct pay to workers kept pace with the consumer price index (RAND, 
2006). 
The competitive forces experienced by the Big Six shipyards, constant financial 
performance pressures, and a troubled labor market help explain the behavior of 
shipbuilders.  This chapter uses Porter’s (1980) framework to examine the five 
competitive forces with which Northrop Grumman and General Dynamics must deal.  
Rivalry in this industry is not overly intense, ultimately benefiting the industry.  While 
both companies to compete with one another for Navy shipbuilding contracts, the two 
companies also partner with each other on various programs, like sharing construction 
contracts for the Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) Class destroyer for example.  Additionally, the 
federal government desires that all the shipyards owned and operated by General 
Dynamics and Northrop Grumman remain open in order to maintain the United States’ 
ability to build ships and to maintain strong local economies.  There is only one primary 
buyer of ships, the U.S. Navy, which normally gives that buyer the power to drive down 
prices.  However, this buyer power is offset because there are only two primary suppliers 
of ships.  Buyer power, therefore, can best be described as neutral in this market.  
Suppliers of shipbuilding materials are marked by high concentration and there is a lack 
of substitute supplies for shipyards to purchase.  Because of the importance of these 
supplier’s products, shipbuilders are vulnerable to suppliers who enjoy a moderate 
amount of power in this industry.  The threat of new entrants into this market is low 
because of the advantages of economies of scale enjoyed by existing firms, significant 
barriers to entry, and a great deal of consolidation having already occurred in this 
industry.  This low threat of new entrants benefits existing firms.  Finally, there are no 
substitute products threatening these companies, providing another benefit to existing 
firms.  As a whole, the three of the five competitive forces benefit existing firms in the 
industry, one is neutral, and only one negatively impacts the industry. 
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An examination of available financial data reveals that the shipbuilding segments 
of these two parent companies rank last in terms of operating margin, with Northrop 
Grumman Ship Systems also ranking last in net sales and General Dynamics Marine 
Systems ranking third out of four in new sales.  This indicates that these business units 
are the least profitable for their respective parent company.  Both units are still profitable, 
however, with Ship Systems providing 14.1 percent of Northrop Grumman’s 2006 
operating margins and Marine Systems providing 14.3 percent of General Dynamic’s 
operating margin in that same year.  Concerning the company-wide return on investment, 
only General Dynamics bests the industry, sector, and S&P 500.  Northrop Grumman 
lags behind all three.   When compared to the return on investment of the 10 Year 
Treasury Note, General Dynamics once again exceeds this measure while Northrop 
Grumman falls short.  Based on this, it could be reasonably expected for Northrop 
Grumman’s concerns regarding the Navy’s shipbuilding plan to have a higher salience 
due to the potential increased urgency of their limited financial performance. 
Labor is great concern for shipbuilders.  Unstable work creates job insecurity for 
the highly skilled workers needed to build ships.  These workers moved into other 
industries that provide greater job security and the companies have not recovered from 
this worker migration.  This insecurity also causes these companies difficulty in hiring 
and retaining workers.  Labor is a key determinant in productivity and efficiency and 
represents a substantial portion of the total procurement cost of naval ships.  Increased 
labor hours are already a major source of overhead cost growth as demonstrated in the 
construction of recent ships purchased by the Navy.  An aging work force compounds 
this labor problem.  As workers age and retire, health care and pension costs increase, 
something these companies are beginning to experience as a portion of this labor 
overhead cost growth is due to these costs. 
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VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Navy managers must understand stakeholders of the shipbuilding plan and their 
relationships before developing strategies to manage them.  While broad research has 
generically termed the relationship that exists between Congress, the Department of 
Defense, and defense contractors the iron triangle, figure 7 depicts, in the stakeholder 
environment model, the iron triangle as it applies to the Navy’s Thirty-Year Shipbuilding 
Plan.  Congress, the Navy’s shipbuilding plan, and the shipbuilders form the three points 
of the triangle.  The legs of the triangle, which connect these three points, show the 
methods of influence each has on other.  The stakeholder environment model adds the 
various stakeholders, shown in the boxes, who exert pressures upon each of these entities. 
             
Figure 7. Shipbuilding Plan Stakeholder Relationships [After: Freeman, 1984] 
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This thesis specifically examines shipbuilders, defining their current behavior and 
explaining why they might be behaving in this fashion.  Armed with this understanding, 
Navy managers can begin to focus on individual stakeholder strategies to manage this 
stakeholder group.  As such, are scathing rebukes and tough love the correct approach for 
the Navy to take with shipbuilders?  To answer this question, Frooman (1999) offers 
guidance.  The relationship between the Navy and shipbuilders is one of mutual 
dependence.  Mutual dependence exists when there is reciprocal exposure between the 
firm and stakeholder (Frooman, 1999).  Shipbuilders rely almost entirely on the Navy for 
their income and the Navy relies on shipbuilders to supply the Fleet with warships and 
supporting vessels.  Neither the Navy nor shipbuilders can walk away from each other.  
Frooman (1999) says of mutual dependence, “The welfare of each will be linked to the 
other, so each will do well only by attending to needs of the other” (p. 197).   
Shipbuilders are also dependent stakeholders, meaning they rely on others to carry out 
their will (Mitchell, et al., 1997).  Frooman (1999) defines indirect strategies as those “in 
which the stakeholder works through an ally by having the ally manipulate the flow of 
resources to the firm” (p. 198).  Shipbuilders can be expected to use indirect strategies by 
asking for help from Congress, a dominant stakeholder.  This has already been evidenced 
by their reluctance to confront the Navy in court regarding money owed them by the 
Navy as well as other proposed legislative language from Congressional testimony.   
In order to avoid Congressional mandates and restrictions that come from 
shipbuilders’ indirect strategies, the Navy should make efforts to address the concerns of 
shipbuilders so they will not need to seek help from Congress.  This thesis discussed 
some of shipbuilder’s biggest concerns: increased stability, longer production runs, and 
reducing change orders.  These are best summed as the ability to integrate practices of 
best-in-class shipyards in order to reduce the higher costs of operating a job-shop 
business model.  By changing and bettering the business cases currently in use, the Navy 
signals a spirit of cooperation with shipbuilders, keeping with the tenants of a mutually 
dependent relationship.  Moreover, bettering current business cases allows the Navy to 
achieve one of the primary goals of the shipbuilding plan as outlined by Admiral Mullen: 
stability in the shipbuilding industry.  Stability from the perspective of shipbuilders is not 
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just deciding on a specific number of ships in the Fleet, but the number of ships ordered 
from year to year.  When the numbers in the shipbuilding plan fluctuate each year, 
shipyards cannot plan how much material to buy, what labor requirements will be, and 
whether they will be able to build enough ships to offset capital investment costs, an 
important factor in determining if those investments should even be made.  Stability 
allows shipbuilders to better control costs, which is something both the Navy and 
Congress want. 
Therefore, in order to develop a cooperative stakeholder strategy, the Navy must 
make a commitment to year-to-year shipbuilding plan stability by bettering business 
cases and industry firms must make a commitment to control costs.  To better business 
cases and accomplish year-to-year stability, this thesis recommends adopting the 
recommendations proposed by the GAO in its July 2007 report to Congress entitled 
“Realistic Business Cases Needed to Execute Navy Shipbuilding Programs.”  The GAO 
suggests the Navy adopt a knowledge-based management framework.  This framework 
requires that technological maturity must be proven before designs can be considered 
stable and production outcomes being guaranteed only after these designs are stable 
(Francis, 2007).  Additionally, the GAO recommends the Navy improve cost estimating 
practices, which allows initial shipbuilding budgets to be realistically achievable, and that 
the Navy increase the use of fixed-price contracting and comprehensive cost surveillance, 
which improve overall cost management (Francis, 2007). 
B. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Future research should examine the effect of unions on the shipbuilding industry.  
Unions are an important piece of the overall labor picture.  They exact higher wages and 
better benefits for their members, which translate to higher costs for shipbuilders.  
Additionally, unions set forth qualification standards for their members, with higher 
qualified members receiving more compensation for their labor.  As technology 
increases, workers must have ever increasing qualification levels, further increasing 
shipbuilder’s labor costs.  Due to the limitations of publicly available information, this 
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thesis was unable to examine this portion of labor pressures on Northrop Grumman Ship 
Systems and General Dynamics Marine Systems.  
Freeman’s model calls for examination of all stakeholders.  Future researchers 
should examine Congress, the other key stakeholder to the Navy’s Thirty-Year 
Shipbuilding Plan.  Budgetary maters are always highly political.  Congress as a whole 
has overarching goals, which include but are not limited to reducing federal deficit 
spending and providing national security.  However, each Congressman and Senator 
represents a specific constituency.  Reelection often depends on local economic 
conditions, including employment.  Winning defense contracts can bring or keep jobs and 
money in states and districts.  By understanding these varied, dynamic environments, 
Navy shipbuilding planners can anticipate how individual Congressmen and Senators and 
Congress as a body might react to shipbuilding plans, and subsequently develop 
individual strategies to manage this stakeholder group.  Additionally, future research 
should examine internal Navy pressures and the competition for and trade-offs between 
acquisitions programs that occur because of the demands for the Navy’s budgetary 
dollars.  After studying all the key external stakeholders in the iron triangle – defense 
contractors and Congress – integrated stakeholder strategies can be developed, 
completing Freeman’s final step in his stakeholder analysis process. 
Future research might also include how stakeholder perception plays a role in 
stakeholder strategy development.  For example, shipbuilders might underestimate their 
influential power on the Navy, perceiving it to be weaker than it actually is.  If the 
perception of power determines what courses of action they might take and should they 
perceive a stronger position, they might become more aggressive and confrontational in 
influencing the shipbuilding plan in their favor.  They might, for example, file a lawsuit 
over unpaid bills and take the issue to court, something they thus far have been unwilling 
to do. 
Finally, recent trends in the Department of Defense and other government 
agencies indicate a greater tendency toward privatization, believing the private sector 
brings about better results than business operations run by the government.  This is 
indicative of the Navy divesting itself of public, Navy-run shipyards in the last few 
 51
decades.  Future research could examine whether the assumptions of better results in the 
private market place are true.  If they are true, to what extent and if these assumptions are 
not true, should the Navy attempt vertical integration by returning to public, Navy-run 
yards for their shipbuilding needs? 
Applying Freeman’s (1984) stakeholder management model to the Navy’s Thirty-
Year Shipbuilding plan, this thesis determines who the key stakeholders are with regard 
to this plan, specifically analyzes shipbuilder’s behavior, and explains their behavior.  In 
so doing, Navy shipbuilding plan managers have a better understanding of their external 
environment and can begin to formulate or revise strategies and practices that address the 
issues of this particular stakeholder group. 
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